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This excellent chapter revisits the in￿ uential ￿expansionary ￿scal contraction￿(EFC)
hypothesis. The EFC hypothesis highlights that there are nonlinearities in ￿scal dynamics,
with the impact of ￿scal austerity sharply di⁄ering between ￿scally-stable and ￿scally-
unstable economies. If ￿scal austerity signals to investors that the debt level will stabilise
or even decline over time, it may be associated with a decline in sovereign default risk and
a reduction in interest rates. For countries with a ￿ exible exchange rate, it may also signal
a reduction in in￿ ation and the expected rate of devaluation, so that it further reduces
nominal interest rates through this channel. If ￿scal austerity reduces the expected future
tax burden on workers/households and investors, it can also boost the real economy by
raising the expected post-tax return to working and investing.
It is notoriously di¢ cult to test the EFC hypothesis. The number of cases of sustained
￿scal austerity is relatively small and many factors in￿ uence macroeconomic outcomes, so
that there is a limited value to econometric studies. Rather, this chapter provides a careful
treatment of a number of important case studies and this approach is highly informative.
The author provides a useful feedback rule for the ￿scal surplus
￿s = ￿y￿y + ￿p￿p + ￿y￿y + "s (1)
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1where ￿y > 0 captures the operation of automatic stabilisers, ￿p > 0 allows for revenue
windfalls from asset price booms, ￿y > 0 re￿ ects activist counter-cyclical policy interven-
tions and "s measures acyclical shifts in the ￿scal position. In fact, the set of ￿nancial
factors that can in￿ uence ￿scal outcomes extends beyond asset prices (Benetrix and Lane
2011). Large current account de￿cits mean that spending levels are ahead of income levels,
which boosts revenues from indirect tax sources. In related fashion, rapid credit growth can
re-orientate the economy from tax-poor export activity to tax-rich nontradables production
(since VAT is not levied on exports) and also boost revenue from transaction taxes (stamp
duties on housing purchases).
Furthermore, it should be recognised that governments follow pro-cyclical policies in
many countries. Revenue windfalls from a ￿nancial boom may prompt additional spending
or tax cuts, such that ￿p <= 0 is possible. In similar vein, political economy factors or
cognitive problems (a failure to di⁄erentiate between cyclical upturns and improvements in
trend growth) mean that output expansions may induce discretionary ￿scal expansions so
that ￿y <= 0. Given the cross-country and cross-time heterogeneity in these coe¢ cients,
panel-type estimation will limited value in understanding the speci￿c experiences of indi-
vidual countries, which reinforces the desirability of the case-study approach developed in
this chapter.
The careful treatment of the ￿scal data for each country in this chapter is a salutary
lesson for empirical ￿scal research. It underlines the importance of di⁄erentiating between
announced ￿scal plans and the actual implementation, with the role of mid-year ￿scal
adjustments especially important in understanding ￿scal outcomes. Another lesson is that
the multi-year nature of ￿scal adjustment episodes means that it is important that the
￿event window￿is selected appropriately, in order to fully capture the full impact of ￿scal
adjustment programmes. Again, this provides a warning against ￿one size ￿ts all￿empirical
approaches, since the appropriate event window may vary across di⁄erent episodes. An
important substantial ￿nding from his forensic data investigation is that the contribution
of revenue growth in these ￿scal adjustment episodes has been under-stated in previous
research.
In terms of the economics of ￿scal austerity, Perotti points to several key issues. First,
￿scal austerity was accompanied by exchange rate devaluation in several cases, which may
have been an important support to output growth during these episodes (in addition, the
export channel was a⁄ected by the general state of demand in trading partners). Sec-
2ond, there were sizeable declines in nominal and real interest rates, which can be largely
attributed to a decline in expected in￿ ation. In turn, there was a virtuous cycle by which
lower in￿ ation was reinforced by wage moderation, with this process faciliated by incomes
policies in various countries.
It is important to assess the lessons from these case studies from the 1980s and 1990s for
the current wave of ￿scal austerity programs. The author highlights that competitiveness
gains are hard to achieve in the absence of nominal exchange rate ￿ exibility, especially
when wage in￿ ation is also low in partner countries. With the exception of imposed nom-
inal wage cuts in the public sectors of crisis-hit countries, the evidence so far points to
considerable downward wage rigidities: export-led output growth is hard to engineer under
these conditions, especially when growth is also anaemic in major trading partners.
Perotti points to incomes policies as a factor in wage moderation during these episodes.
It would be good to know about the conditions required for incomes policies to be e⁄ec-
tive. In particular, incomes policies may be more feasible under crisis conditions than in
periods of robust labour demand, if in￿ ation is low but still substantially positive, and in
environments in which a combination of ￿scal austerity and wage moderation can plausibly
provide direct (if partial) payo⁄s to the real incomes of workers through lower interest rates
(lower mortgage rates) and a stronger level for the exchange rate (lower cost of imported
consumer goods).
For the euro area, a common central bank means that policy interest rates do not
respond to country-speci￿c ￿scal actions. That said, the very high country spreads that
have emerged during the euro crisis means that ￿scal dynamics can be improved by austerity
programs that successfully reduce perceived default risks. In turn, in relation to the wider
economy, the sovereign risk premium in￿ uences the cost of funding for the domestic banking
system, even if some larger corporates might be able to obtain international funding at a
lower cost.
The analysis in this paper also indicates that there is plenty of room for new research
on several dimensions of ￿scal adjustment. In relation to revenue growth, the relative
contribution of tax rate increases versus the broadening of the tax base is an important
topic. In terms of spending cuts, the balance across transfer programs, public consumption
and public investment should be further assessed in relation to their relative impact on
short-term and long-term economic performance.
A major issue concerns the impact of banking crises on the design and execution of
3￿scal adjustment programs. While Perotti classi￿es Finland and Sweden in the 1990s as
representing adjustment under ￿ exible-rate (in￿ ation-targeting) regimes, the banking crises
su⁄ered by these countries are central to ￿scal and macroeconomic dynamics during these
episodes.
While there is much to learn from previous episodes, it is important to bear in mind
some key structural shifts. In particular, the levels of domestic and international ￿nancial
development are far greater now than twenty years ago. The ratios of domestic credit to
GDP have grown sharply (especially in the euro periphery), while the ratios of cross-border
￿nancial assets and liabilities to GDP have expanded even more rapidly. This means that
￿balance sheet￿mechanisms are more powerful now than in the past, which can change
the design of optimal ￿scal policy. For instance, the interaction of credit constraints and
high sectoral debt levels (households, ￿rms) mean that declines in current disposable income
have a disproportionate impact on private-sector default rates. In turn, if taxpayers are the
ultimate underwriters of the banks, this can o⁄set the ￿scal impact of austerity measures.
Especially for countries that cannot devalue, an important implication is that the realistic
and optimal speed of ￿scal adjustment is slower than in previous episodes.
Second, the very large increase in cross-border ￿nancial positions means that the spillover
impact of ￿nancial market stress has grown considerably. This consideration, reinforced by
the synchronised timing of ￿scal austerity in many countries in the current crisis, means
that it is vital that a global perspective on ￿scal adjustment is maintained by policymakers.
Accordingly, country-by-country ￿scal analysis should be supplemented by broader research
that fully incorporates the various macroeconomic and ￿nancial interdependencies across
countries.
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